Peace,2 his speeches to the diplomatic COrpS3 and before the UN and its suborganizations, as well as his speeches from over one hundred journeys abroad, from thematic initiatives like the Dialogue of Religions,4 and from his interventions on contemporary crises 5 of his pontificate.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE POPE'S PEACE AGENDA

I.l The Basis: Human Dignity
The basis for John Paul II's peace doctrine is anthropology. The human being in all his ambivalence is the center of theological-ethical thinking:6 On the one hand, John Paul saw the human being as "the only creature wanted by God for his own sake."7 On the other hand, the "inner ambivalence" of human beings8 has been the recurrent theme of uncountable texts: the sinful human being does not take advantage of his possibilities, and it is only through "the redemption that resulted from the cross [that] man is given back his dignity and the meaning for his being in the world."9 Thus, "human beings have gained in Christ and through Christ complete knowledge of their dignity, ... of the transcendental value of their own being human and of the meaning of their existence."l0 This Christologically interpreted anthropology can help explain an oft-quoted statement in which the Pope's high appreciation for humankind is expressed: "How precious must man be in the eyes of the Creator," John Paul II wonders, "if he 'gained so great a Redeemer.' "ll Human dignity is based on this integral view of the human being as "God's creation, created in His image, as a being that is capable of recognizing the invisible; that reaches for the absolute, for God; that is made to love and that is destined to an eternal calling."12 From this theological reasoning of human dignity, John Paul concluded that which is elsewhere inferred philosophically, namely that "the human being in his dignity must never be reduced to a means that one can regard and manipulate as an instrument."13 On his uncountable papal pilgrimages, John Paul II bore with him the idea of the dignity of every individual human being, and he never tired of addressing its violation. He believed the Church must perceive the human being "with the eyes of Christ Himself' in order to discover "what is deeply human: the search for truth, the insatiable thirst for the Good, the hunger for freedom, the longing for beauty, the voice of the conscience."14 Looking at the human being in today' s world with the eyes of Christ reveals what pertains to the human being as a human being. In this way, "the entire concept of human rights is based on the idea of the dignity of the human person, i.e., on one fundamental value, the source of inalienable rights." 15 In contrast to his predecessors, who argued from the perspective of natural law, John Paul II's "Christocentric humanism"16 permitted him to perceive human rights as part of his theological anthropology. 17
Defending Human Rights as Part of the Christian Joyous Message
The Church has evolved from being a church that, under John Paul II's predecessors, struggled with human rights to being a church that is permeated by Christologically based human rights and that defends them as an integral part of its joyous message. 18 being endowed with these rights, "human beings [become] the path of the Church ... , the path of her daily life and experience," and the Church must learn to see them with Christ's eyes. Human existence is kept open by the eschatological tension in Christ's message concerning a possible step towards the realization of the humanum. It is hardly surprising that on his more than one hundred journeys abroad John Paul II sought personal meetings with commoners to discuss with them their lives; by doing this, he hoped to make "the Church of our times always realize anew the situation of the human being."19 He understood that, in order to advance to a time when "all areas of this life correspond to the true dignity of human beings,"20 an integral part of his papacy would be to speak repeatedly about human rights and about their violation. John Paul II's significance in motivating support for human rights groups within the former Soviet Union's reach of power and in the revolutionary upheavals at the end of the 1980s is often cited. His political effect was rooted in his theological anthropology, which he knew the public would embrace. 21 In his first speech before the UN General Assembly in 1979, John Paul 11 praised the General Declaration on Human Rights as a "milestone in the long and stony road of humankind,"22 as human rights denote "the substance of the dignity of the human being, understood in his entirety, not as reduced to one dimension only." The union of people and states, as envisioned by the UN, "is through each human being, through the definition and recognition of and respect for the inalienable rights of individuals.'>23 Inasmuch as every policy has to serve the human being, human rights should be the motivating force in an individual state's policies, just as they are for the UN's policies.
In his speech to the General Assembly of the UN, John Paul II endorsed individual freedom rights, rights of political self-determination, and social rights:
The right to life and liberty and to personal safety; the right to food, clothes, and a shelter, to health, relaxation and recreation; the right to free speech, to education and culture, the right to freedom of thought, of conscience, of religion as well as the right to confess one's religion in private and in public, by oneself and in a community; the right to choose one's lifestyle, to have a family and to have all necessary conditions for a family life; the right to property and work, to adequate working conditions and fair pay; the right to hold meetings and join in associations; the right to freedom of movement in one's own country and foreign countries; the right to citizenship and to a place of residence; the right to political co-determination and the right to participation in free elections of the political system of the people to whom one belongs,24 Not to satisfy these rights means very simply to scorn the dignity of the human being,25 John Paul II acknowledged that some human rights are a human construct in that they represent a positive-law response to some of the sorrowful experiences of human history. But he also pointed to the "worldencompassing character" of the human rights movement as "a first and basic 'chiffI'e' that affirms that there are truly general human rights that are rooted in the nature of each person which reflect the objective and undeniable demands for a universal morallaw."26 This consideration allowed the Pope to make the connection to traditional natural law reasoning: 27
It appears to me that what the Church's teachings knows as the "natural order" of living together, "the God-given order," partly finds its expression in the culture of human rights, if one can characterize a culture that is based on the respect for the transcendental value of a person like this,28 John Paul II believed that the relation between the law of nature and positive law is comparable to the relation between fundamental human rights and single legal norms:
Natural law does not provide the law-maker with a single norm; these remain to be complemented continually. The Pope referred to the human rights movement as empirical evidence that what befits human beings as human beings is universally acknowledged as self-evident. Derived from the "common good of humankind," these evident rights correlate with the consciousness that every human being has the capacity to reach and which directs what one feels one ought to do: "Human rights ... go into everybody's conscience."30 From this point of view, human rights can be seen as the "general, in the heart of human beings' engraved moral law," as "a kind of 'grammar' that serves the world to deal with this discussion about its own future."3! Introducing this ethical grammar into the (world) political discourse is, according to John Paul II, the task of the Church; in this, "[the Church] offers a reflection on the principles that should guide the lives of people and nations.'>32
The Pope highlighted two central threats to human rights at the beginning of his pontificate and made them a subject of discussion in subsequent years: the threat resulting from the worldwide justice deficit between rich and poor (the "terrible inequalities between human beings and groups in excessive wealth on the one side and the demographic majority of the poor on the other"), and the threat resulting from "forms of injustices in the spiritual sphere," which harm the human being "in his inner relationship to truth."33 As Christian philosophy believes that the freedom of a human being is fully realized through his or her relationship to truth,34 John Paul II classified violations of the right to freedom of belief and conscience as among the most serious human rights violations.
As human freedom "is realized in the search and action for truth,"35 the need to freely search for truth justifies the freedom of belief and conscience; it is "the core of human rights."36 With respect to the right to freedom of belief and conscience, John Paul 
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[Vol. 3: 1 an integral part of the attainment of political freedom?8 Second, he criticized democratic societies that attempted to block out religion from public discourse: "Should those citizens whose judgment concerning ethics is influenced by their belief be less free to voice their deep-felt persuasions than othersT 39 Third, he believed that religious freedom includes the freedom to change religions: it constitutes human nature to follow the conscience in a search for truth, and thus nobody should be forced to act against his conscience. 4o John Paul II emphasized this third point in his discussions with Islamic persons. 41
The Protection of Human Rights as a Responsibility of Every Legal System
John Paul II believed that it is, above all, the responsibility of the state authority to protect human rights. If the fundamental rights of the individual are protected, the community is well-ordered: "The common good that authority in the State serves is brought to full realization only when all the citizens are sure of their rights."42 Engrained in the dignity of the person, human rights are "no concession of the state"; instead, by securing human rights, the state is acknowledging that which had "been a priori given to his own legal system."43 In the dispute with communist totalitarianism in the 1980s, the Polish Pope referred again and again in support of the notion that the negation of indisposable human rights is only possible at the cost of repression:
The Brothers have shown in the countries, in which a party has for years dictated the truth one had to believe and the meaning one had to give to history, that it is not possible to suffocate elementary freedoms that give meaning to the life of a human being: Accordingly, John Paul IT saw the development of the human rights movement as inevitable, as the movement gave "concrete political expression to one of the great dynamics of contemporary history."45
The human rights movement in Europe of the 1980s systematically laid out what would have political consequences twenty years later. With the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's (CSCE) Final Document (the "Helsinki Accords"), human rights became recognized as a limit to the sovereignty of a state: "Governments that respect the rule of law indeed recognize the limits of their power and of their spheres of interest. For these governments concede that they are themselves subject to law and not the rulers of law."46 At the end of the 1980s, the people of Eastern Europe demanded that their governments comply with the human rights and political freedoms encompassed in the Helsinki Accords. Only years later did the question arise as to whether the international community had to help oppressed peoples-victims of massive violations of human rights-when their respective government is not able or not willing to do SO.47
Humanity as the Constitutive Community
From the fundamental notion that every human being is endowed with inalienable rights because of his dignity, John Paul II believed that it followed, in principle, that every human being has the duty to help whenever a person's rights are endangered. In support of this principle, John Paul II referred to the biblical demand for universal love of one's neighbor: "Sacred Scripture ... demands of us a shared responsibility for all of humanity. This duty . . . extends progressively to all mankind, since no one can consider himself extraneous or indifferent to the lot of another member of the human family."48 Humanity, "beyond its ethnic, national, cultural and relig- ious differences, should form a community"49 from which universal solidarity claims are derived. John Paul II developed these claims in his 1991 social encyclical Centesimus Annus.
II. THE POPE'S PEACE AGENDA IN SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES
Il.i Option for Non-Violence
Time and again, John Paul II forcefully and publicly opposed recourse to violence in international relations. As a result, some criticize him as being a pacifist who ignored the reality of international politics. Other wellmeaning critics believe his passionate appeals against war and violence were rooted in his decisive stance for human life. I believe that neither critique goes far enough. I would first like to document the decisiveness with which John Paul II opposed violence, using a few quotes from his speeches:
Violence 
Id.
[V]iolence always needs to justify itself through deceit, and to appear, however falsely, to be defending a right or responding to a threat posed by others. 57 Violence is only a way of death and destruction, and it dishonours the holiness of God and the dignity of man. 58 War cannot be an adequate means ... to solve completely existing problems between nations. It never was and it never will be!59
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In Centesimus Annus, in response to political realists who argued that violence is a natural interstate condition, John Paul II cited the contrasting experience and worldwide political significance of non-violence: "It seemed that the European order resulting from the Second W orId War and sanctioned by the Yalta Agreements could only be overturned by another war. Instead, it has been overcome by the non-violent commitment.,,6o The Pope attributed this success to the "commitment of people who . . . [had always refused] to yield to the force of power." Against the dictatorship of the powerful, the protesting demonstrators bore "witness to the truth."61 "This disarmed the adversary."62 John Paul II saw the overthrow of the Eastern European totalitarian regime as a "warning" to those figures in world politics "who, in the name of political realism, wish to banish law and morality from the political arena."63 The overthrow represents a warning because it was driven by morality, by a dedication to truth and freedom; the demonstrators fought a non-violent battle with the "weapons of truth and justice."64
John Paul II knew all too well that many people paid a high personal price for this nonviolent commitment, including paying with their lives. He interpreted this suffering for political change Christologically as a sacrifice for others: "[B]y uniting his own sufferings for the sake of truth and freedom to the sufferings of Christ on the Cross ... man is able to accomplish the miracle of peace."65 To stoically tolerate violence is not to emulate Christ; following Christ's example entails opposing violence and consciously accepting the consequences of this political commitment. A cornerstone of John Paul II's thinking was his belief that the Cold War ended as a result of three factors: non-militaristic diplomacy that centered on ethical and legal positions, the nonviolent commitment of the population for political changes, and, particularly, the inclusion of the human rights catalogue in the Helsinki Final Act. As church leader and Polish patriot, he supported and assisted these processes in his home country to a considerable extent. Drawing upon the experience of the first ten years of his pontificate, John Paul II would advise the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue and to have patience when he believed (often justifiably) that the use of military force would not be the parties' last but rather first resort. In response to the "realist" view that denied that viability of non-violence in international relations, he articulated his position this way:
As you all know, the Holy See has reminded [us) of the ethical imperative that must predominate under all circumstances: of the inviolability of the human person, on whichever side he or she is, the legal force, the importance of dialogues and negotiations, the respect for international agreements. These are the only "weapons" that confer honour to the human being as God wanted him?O It was apparent to the Pope that the protection of life requires a political order. He believed that although, generally speaking, the democratic 66. Id constitutional state has prevailed over anarchical, violent conflict settlement, the international community still resides in the state of anarchy, as conflicts are too often settled by violent means. His regular and passionate calls against violence in international relations were rooted in his belief that violence does not lead to a more peaceful world. According to John Paul II, to overcome violence, we must actively search for and address the roots of violence, and upon this idea he identified two different areas of responsibility: the international community is responsible for addressing the world's existing injustices, and the believers of all confessions and religions are responsible for addressing the imminent threat of a "clash of civilizations." While the Pope actively campaigned for nonviolent solutions, he did not deny the necessity of the use of force as a last resort, as we shall see later.
II. 2 Reconciliation and Dialogue between Confessions and Religions as a Peace Program
Certain groups, such as al-Qaeda and those groups involved in the war in former Yugoslavia, search for historical and religious justifications for their politically motivated eruptions of violence. The Pope saw a necessity to take countermeasures against these groups. "In the depths of our faith," he said in 1988, "the decision for dialogue and friendship with the followers of other religions is rooted in order ... to cooperate ... in the pursuit of promoting the unity of the human family."71 This belief is not a political calculation, but a religious conviction in the light of the peace message, a conviction upon which John Paul II often acted: for example, beginning in 1986, in an effort to establish a visible testimony against the instrumentalization of beliefs, he repeatedly invited representatives of all religions to Assisi to engage in common prayer. Given the multiple historical burdens, John Paul II believed that an honest dialogue was only possible when the past had been dealt with. As a result, he did not confront other religions with their offenses against Christians, but confronted his own church, us, with our offenses against believers of other confessions and religions. The history of the Church, the Pope wrote in preparation of the Holy Year 2000, records many events "which constitute a counter-testimony to Christianity."n Moreover, John Paul II was concerned with more than just the offenses of past generations: "Yet we too, sons and daughters of the Church, have sinned .... As the Successor of Peter, I ask that in this year of mercy the Church ... should kneel before God and implore forgiveness for the past and present sins of her sons and daughters.'03
This confession of gUilt and the diverse requests for forgiveness have prompted approval but also critique. Konrad Repgen asks critically whether events of past epochs can be judged adequately from today' s perspective. 74 According to Olaf Blaschke, assigning the blame to the "Sons and Daughters of the Church" is an obscure attempt to absolve the Church itself of its guileS While agreeing to this assertion, Pierre Gervais asks how it might change the understanding of the Church as a mystery. 76
After asking God for forgiveness for the sins, John Paul II demanded, as the necessary second step, that the Church approach the other confessions and religions and ask them for forgiveness for the injustice they endured at the hands of the Catholics. The remembrance of the events entailed by this task "should ensure that evil will never again win the upper hand. In these meetings, he emphasized the commonalities of Abrahamitic religions and advocated respectful dialogue between Christians and Muslims. Since the history of conquests and crusades burdened the relationship between Christians and Muslims, the Pope called upon both to forgive: "Whenever Muslims and Christians have offended each other, we must ask the Almighty for forgiveness for that and offer forgiveness to one another."86 Based on the dialogue that he cultivated for more than twenty years, the Holy See and the al-Azhar University in Cairo were able to condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11 in a joint declaration just one day later: "Such acts of violence do not lead to peace in the world."87 With regard to a consensus with the Islamic authorities, the Pope could pass judgment when it was urgently needed: "The use of force in the name of one's own confession is a distortion of what the great religions teach. As different religious leaders have often emphasized, I would thus also like to emphasize that the use of force can never find a valid religious justification nor can it promote the development of true religiousness."88 "Nobody is allowed to kill in the name of God."89
The confession of guilt is for John Paul II the first step of a real dialogue between religions and confessions. John Paul II also took this step with respect to the churches of the Reformation on the occasion of the canonization of Jan Sarkander in the Czech Republic: Today I, the Pope of Rome, ask in the name of all Catholics for forgiveness for the injustices committed against non-Catholics in the course of the turbulent history of these people; and, at the same time, I assure you of the forgiveness of the Catholic Church for all the wrongs that her children have suffered. 90 125 Given the multitude of Christian churches and confessions, the Pope's main concern was to reestablish the lost unity of God's people in hopes of offering the restored communion as a testament to peace. Pope John Paul II was well aware that for many of the other Christian churches it is precisely his office that constituted the main obstacle to the unity he sought. Indeed, his offer of communication with other Christian religions reflected this understanding, implicitly at least: "[i]f certain forms of unity from the past no longer meet with the impulses for unity that the Holy Ghost stimulates in Christians nowadays everywhere, then all of us have to follow more openly and attentively what the Ghost tells the Church now."91
The Pope's objective in approaching the other Christian confessions, on one hand, was a united authentic testimony for the belief in a God who overcomes hate and violence. God's people, the Pope argued, should "shine [again as] a sign and means for the closest union with God, for the unity of the entirety of humankind in the world."92 On the other hand, the aim of the Pope's dialogue between other religions was to promote the joint work of religions to secure world peace while, at the same time, respecting the differences in their theologies. 93 The Pope argued that the theological explanation for this relationship between the Catholic Church and non-Christian religions was a recognition of the "truth" that can be found in other religions:
While the Catholic Church clearly applies its identity, its teachings and its missionary creed to all people, she does not she herself believes and teaches but all the same not seldom hold a stream of that truth that enlightens all human-beings. 94 The Pope believed that through mutual understanding and respectful dialogue, religions would be able to ward off becoming a political instrument, as well as religious fanaticism or terrorism. 95 Overcoming violence, as I have said before, for John Paul II meant to look actively for the root causes of violence and address them if possible. The Pope saw it as the responsibility of Christians, through authentic testimony, to commit to the Christian peace message: together with the believers of the other religions, we are called to install an international order that is rooted in the dignity of and respects the rights of all human beings, to lobby for the continuous development of international law and UN institutions, and to advocate for nonviolent conflict resolution. 96 Part of this effort is also a commitment to ensure justice among the world's peoples and states. John Paul II developed his vision for this in the social encycles Sollicitudo Rei Socia lis (1987) and Centesimus Annus (1991): "God has given the earth to the human race so that she could nourish all her members." "Here," John Paul II concludes, "is rooted the universal purpose of the earth's goods."97 Given the situation of many people-even whole peoples-the "stronger nations (must) offer ... the weaker the opportunity to integrate into the international life."98 This is, the Pope summarized, the demand of justice: we must protect the world's most vulnerable, "whom the state and the market have to serve."99
For John Paul II a justice that ends at the borders of one's own state and subjects other human beings and nations solely to the calculus of power and the interests of political realism is nothing more than the behaviour of a band of gangsters who divide their bounty among themselves according to principles of equality. John Paul II made such global justice deficits a subject of discussion time and again-while not neglecting intrastate justice deficits, such as corruption in developing countries, for example.
1°O Simply put, the Pope thought that an international law that was ethically committed to, and thus oriented by, human rights, is an essential step towards accomplishing justice for all. But how can existing international law gain importance?
III. THE POPE'S TEACHING ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
Il!.l Creating Trust by Respecting International Law
Referring to the experiences in the CSCE, John Paul II made clear that peace does not primarily depend on military security but, above all, on developing a trust between nations.
lOi Given an international legal system in which the global-public authority is (still) missing, trust in the legal system-or legal security-only develops if subjects of international law (nation states) themselves submit to the basic norms of the law. Consequently, international law can "not be the right of the stronger and not even the right of a minority of states nor the right of an international organization."102 Given a world consisting of "unequal states,"103 then, genuine trust in international law can only develop if "those states that carry more weight and thus have greater responsibility do their utmost [to ensure] that the principles of international law are respected faithfully."104 Only the example of leading powers submitting to international law can bring about a certain degree of legal security, which is essential to creating and maintaining world peace.
While there had been some hope a secure and just international legal order would emerge immediately after the end of the Cold War-the Charter of Paris, for example, proclaimed just such hope-the years that followed were disappointing. This was reflected in John Paul II's assessment of the NATO-led intervention, without a UN mandate, in Kosovo: "Never before had the actors of the international community had a comprehensive work of such precise and complete norms and conventions at their disposal as today. What is lacking is the will to respect and apply them."105 Thus, international law, the Pope recognized, has no chance of really being recognized if the relevant actors on the international stage do not consider it indispensable-or, at the very least, in their own interests-to abide by law.
Here, in John Paul II's view, seemed to be the central problem of the international order: "the political will to apply the existing (legal texts or 
/II.2 The United Nations as a Sub-Goal toward an International Authority
Pius XII and John XXIII had already argued globalisation imposed on the international community the responsibility to submit to an order. Relying on these ideas, John Paul II built upon the idea of the "interdependence of humanity" to argue that the "welfare [of] humanity" requires an "attitude of worldwide solidarity."109 Just like John XXIII before him, John Paul II considered international welfare as analogous to public welfare. If the "welfare that serves the authority of the state ... can only be fully realized if all citizens are secure [in] their rights,"110 the Pope observed, this was also analogically true on the global leveL Thus, human rights form the basis for the intrastate legal order as well as for the international legal order. The Pope recognized that this had not always been the case; instead, he thought, international law had gone through a transformative process from "a kind of extension of unlimited sovereignty" to "a code of conduct for the human farnily 
implication. And international law itself is founded on values."I13
These values are codified as the charter of human rights. Therefore, in order for a just international order to emerge, human rights must be observed as the basis of international law.
The Pope thought that human rights were, as pre~state law, part of international law and, thus, a limit on state sovereigntyY4 Despite the ad~ vancement achieved by international law in the twentieth century, the Pope believed the international community, at least as it seemed to regard the validity of international law, to be closer to the "law of the jungle"ll5 than to a system of law and order: "[j]ust as the time has finally come when in individual States a system of private vendetta and reprisal has given way to the rule of law, so too a similar step forward is now urgently needed in the international community."116 The Pope's main concern was not that internationallegal norms were lacking, but rather that states must learn to rely "on common legal structures of III's encyclical Pacem in terris to convey his response to the United States government's decision: forty years ago John XXIII had put forth the demand "for a public authority, on the international level, with effective capacity to advance the universal common good."122 The United States' decision to bypass the UN, in the Pope's view, violated this basic requirement of international peace, security, and justice.
While this visionary political demand goes far beyond what can realistically be achieved with the UN today, John Paul II was in agreement with the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council who "championed a world authority that is based on the consent of the people and [that] is equipped with effective means to warrant the respect of justice and trnth."123 Hence, the concrete institutional architecture of the "world authority" is not further developed in John Paul II's teaching, besides his support for the existing UN. The Pope realized that the UN as an institution was still not capable of doing what she was supposed to do for achieving her declared goals-and for fulfilling the role John Paul II assigned to her. And, indeed, shortly before his death, John Paul II had renewed his demand for UN reform with the goal of achieving "a greater degree of international ordering."124 John Paul II regretted that this "vision of an effective international public authority at the service of human rights, freedom and peace has not been entirely realized."125 At the same time, he made clear that the main concern should not be about creating a "global super-State."126 While we do not find any further-developed ideas within papal messages, one could presume that the principle of subsidiary, which is well established in Catholic political ethics, would require that only those tasks to be handed over to the global authority would be the tasks states were not able to deal with. A global federal system could be the answer from this perspective. And, it appears that John Paul II regarded the already-started processes of developing the UN into a public authority as the adequate means to comply with this goal.
John Paul II was clear on the mechanism that should establish the global public authority, even though he was less clear on the shape the authority would eventually take. "It means continuing and deepening processes already even in place to meet the almost universal demand for participatory ways of exercising political authority, international authority, and for transparency and accountability at every level of public life."127 The global public authority "could not ... be established by coercion but only by the consent of nations."128 John Paul II did not, however, elaborate on how the question of global power division should be addressed in practice. This is not the responsibility of the church as she "does not propose economic and political systems or programs,"129 but demands from them respect for human dignity.
Notwithstanding his wish for progress toward this goal, John Paul II was realistic enough to observe that the international community has not only not developed in the direction that she should have as a consequence of the peace teachings of the twentieth-century popes, but that she is also not yet on the path toward global peace at the beginning of the third millennium. John Paul II recognized that the UN, which had been viewed by the twentieth-century popes as the nucleus of a global public authority, tended to struggle against political insignificance or was simply circumvented. "Is this not the time for all to work together for a new constitutional organization of the human family, truly capable of ensuring peace and harmony between peoples, as well as their integral developmentT 130 John Paul II asked, barely hiding the critical undertone.
Just like his predecessors, John Paul II announced the sketched ethical ideal of the UN as a global-public authority. All the same, he was realistic enough to recognize that the UN was not going to become the global-public authority anytime soon; even so, he continually demanded that the status quo move toward that goal. This meant for John Paul II that the UN's existing institutions were respected and strengthened if possible. He expected that existing international law, as well as corresponding international institutions, were to be respected by states as the relevant actors, especially since there was not yet an effective international authority that could enforce states' adherence to the law if necessary.
III.3 Right and Responsibility of Defense
Unfortunately, war remains ever present in the international community, not only as a means to settle disputes among states, but also in the form of military interventions, or even the war against international terror- ism. Given his decisive stance advocating for the recognition of the dignity of every human being and ensuring inviolable respect for God-created life, John Paul II voted for overcoming violence by supporting nonviolent action. Governments go to war much too often and far too quickly, according to the Pope's assessment, without really having been forced to use violence as a last resort; he clearly denounced this practice and thus brought himself under the suspicion as a potential pacifist. At the same time, John Paul II argued in line with Catholic tradition and faced the problem of conflicting norms. In the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II briefly discusses the problem of minus malum:
There are in fact situations in which values proposed by God's Law seem to involve a genuine paradox. This happens for example in the case of legitimate defence, in which the right to protect one's own life and the duty not to harm someone else's life are difficult to reconcile in practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value of life and the duty to love oneself no less than others are the basis of a true right to self-defence ... no one can renounce the right to self-defence out of lack of love for life or for self. This can only be done in virtue of a heroic love which deepens and transfigures the love of self into a radical self-offering, according to the spirit of the Gospel Beatitudes (cf. Mt 5:38-40) .... Moreover, "legitimate defence can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of the State" (Catechism of the Catholic Church No. 2265). Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason. 131 This conflict of norms is reflected in John Paul II's views on several world events. For example, despite his strong emphasis on peaceful resolution of conflict, John Paul II regarded western states' long-maybe too long-process of trying to come to an answer to the question of whether they should intervene militarily in the Bosnia and Herzegovina war as a case in point of these conflicting norms. "The European States and the UN have the duty and the right to intervene to disarm somebody who wants to kill. This does not mean to fuel the war but to stop it."132 While John Paul II viewed the situation in the former Yugoslavia as a "fratricidal war" -one that required the use of military force, as a last re- sort, in order to end "unbearable sufferings for countless innocents"133-he characterized the Gulf War, which aimed for the expUlsion of Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, completely differently: "In its second phase, this was, in my opinion, not so much a defensive war, but rather likened to a war for punishment. Further, the general atmosphere in that region is very tense. The intention was to tum this war into a religious war."134
The Pope thus draws a very fine distinction between defending against aggression and a situation in which the principle of legitimate defense is invoked by the supposed defender, but the "defender" has another objective for acting. Even if he assumed that there was, in principle, a right of defense-possibly a duty to defend-John Paul II, who witnessed World War II in his home country of Poland with his own eyes, was well aware of the consequences: the Pope was quoted in a semiofficial article as saying "[a] defensive war is bad, but if somebody attacks and tramples on the right to life, the right to be, there is a right to defense," But, "[w]e feel in a special way connected to all those who suffer, regardless on which side they may stand."135 It is the immeasurable suffering of the civilian population in every war that makes it obviously so difficult for John Paul II to advocate for the just war theory. Moreover, he was well aware that every use of force is itself a seed of new violence. And, thus, he thought that "war will never be a real solution for the problems of peoples! The more respectable way for mankind is negotiations."136
With the establishment of the UN, member states made an international agreement that the use of force in international relations was forbidden. As the Pope understood the Charter's prohibition on the use of force, "[it] makes provision only for two exceptions."l37 These two exceptions are "the natural right to legitimate self-defence"138 and the use of force in the framework of the collective security system, in which the UN Security Council is allotted the decision making power, in accordance with Chapter VII, to keep world peace. It is significant that John Paul II explicitly conditioned states' right to self-defence on that it is "to be exercised in specific ways and in the context of the UN."139 In this statement, John Paul II alluded to Article 51 of the UN Charter in which the right to self-defense is subordinated to the Security Council's primary responsibility to keep world 133 peace and is consequently only valid "until the Security Council has taken appropriate measures to keep world peace and international security."140 For the Pope, then, the UN was the competent authority, in the just war tradition, that held the responsibility for keeping world peace. As mentioned above, the UN is, however, only a fIrst step toward a global-public authority. John Paul II was, like his predecessors, well aware that the decisions of the Security Council tended to serve more the confined interests of its members-especially its permanent members-than the peace and security of the international community. Nevertheless, the UN was a step in the right direction towards strengthening and building the institutions in which all nations' interests can be balanced against each other in order to strive for universal welfare. As a result, the UN is, according to John Paul II, "the right forum for the international community to take on the responsibility toward its various members that are not in the position to resolve their own problems by themselves."141
IlIA The United Nations as a Competent Authority
The "authority of law" and the "moral power of the highest international" authorities form the basis on which the right to intervene is founded-the purpose of saving "the ethnic groups that have become the victims of the deadly madness of the war-drivers."142 Thus, international law's competence consists of "making the international community take effective action in harmony with the Charter ... so that such measures are taken that are appropriate to ward off potential aggressors."143 Accordingly, the Pope demanded, after the United States had snubbed the UN in its attack on Iraq in 2003, that "[i]t [was] more urgent than ever to return to effective collective security that confers on the organizations of the UN the place and the role that it deserves."144 Simply put, resolving international conflicts, especially if the solution's ultima ratio involves a military intervention, must take place within the UN.
It is evident that John Paul II's teaching on the use of military force was developed within the framework of traditional just war teaching. It should be noted that the Pope was explicit on the question of authority: it is for the UN to decide on the use of force, not a national government. With this position, the Pope did not articulate a new position, but stuck to the position of the Second Vatican Council. 145
1II.5 The Use of Military Force as the Last Resort
Faced with his decisive stance on the defense of life, it was out of the question for John Paul II that the use of military force could ever be considered as anything other than the ultima ratio.l46 At the same time, the Pope had seen that during the war in former Yugoslavia, the European states and the UN took too long before taking effective action and, as a consequence, innocent civilians suffered needlessly. The Pope noted publicly that the "the worst [thing] to happen to today's Europe would be to accept war, which cruelly tonnents millions of men and women, in particular in the Balkan states and in the Caucasus. "147 Because he approached the conflict from the perspective of human rights, it became a question of justice and solidarity to corne to the rescue of those suffering. "It is possible," John Paul II remarked concerning the suffering of the civil population in the Balkans. "to put an end to this if one takes up measures that enforce the rules of law"148; elsewhere, he called this the "principle of non-indifference.'>l49 These statements might still be interpreted to support the claim that John Paul II relied solely on nonmilitary means-even in 1993 at the height of the Balkan wars-like negotiations and sanctions. 15o A bit later, however, he made clear that the dialogue and the negotiations can under no circumstances release one from the duty to disann the aggressors that have taken entire ethnic groups hostage. One has to support the international organizations to collect and distribute the humanitarian aid supplies; if necessary, one has to use force in the process so that the aid supplies can access the needy population as it is a case of justified "humanitarian intervention." 151 After September 11, 2001 , the question that demanded an answer was whether the al-Qaeda attacks against the USA legitimized, as an act of preemptive defense, an attack on Afghanistan, since the Taliban regime had offered its country as a base for the terror organization. In answering this question, John Paul II pointed out that there is "a right to defense against terrorism," because "these terror organizations have used their own followers as weapons to send them out against unarmed, unsuspecting people." Thus, terrorism is based "on the neglect scorn of human life" and commits "unbearable crimes against humanity."152 Defense against terrorism, the Pope said, is "a right that must abide like any other right by moral and ethical rules in the choice of both the aims and the means."153 Here, the Pope was arguing that regardless of the reprehensibility of terrorism, combating terrorism cannot unhinge existing international law, as the case of preemptive self-defense at least threatens to do. 154 Simply put, any use of military force that goes beyond immediate self-defense can, according to the Pope, only be used to enforce elementary legal norms, like efforts to stop the most severe human rights violations. The decision of whether this use of force is warranted belongs to the institution that is above particularistic interests, the UN.
In his last peace message, the Pope admitted freely that there were no persuasive legal answers to the new questions raised by the "plague of terrorism," because international law has so far been based on interstate conflicts. The Pope recognized that "[a] legal order of norms that has been worked out over the course of centuries to organize relations between sovereign states is hard pressed to face conflicts in which groups become active that cannot be captured by conventional definitions of statehood."155
That being said, the UN does not have plenary authority to wage war; it must be a last resort. The Pope thought that when the UN-though it would be more precise to say the Security Council of the UN-begins debating whether using force is an appropriate response against international human rights violators that there are still important limitations within which it must make its decision. " [W] of 2003, at the beginning of the Iraq war. "The Charter of the UN and international law reminds us that even if the security of common welfare is concerned, war is only to be chosen in the worst case and under very strict conditions." 156
The Pope had thus grappled with the question of ius ad bellum, competent authority, just cause, and the ultima ratio and, though starting from a traditional just war posture, has developed some textual adaptations insofar as he put ultima ratio at the core of his admonitions regarding the use of force. That being said, concerning the ethical limits of using force, the Pope hardly deviated from what is already known.
When John Paul II spoke to these questions, his emphasis was on the suffering of the civilian population. He had experienced the effects of war as a young man in Poland. And, thus, cautioned that whoever decides to resort to military means must not forget "the effects [on] the civilian population during and after the fighting."157 The discriminatory principle was, thus, at the core of his thoughts. And, with the entire weight of his papal authority, with "the authority given to Peter and his successors by Christ," and "in community with the bishops of the Catholic Church," John Paul II taught, in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, the tradition that "the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral."158 This prohibition concerns, of course, the "deliberate decision to deprive an innocent human being of his life . . . as a means to a good end."159 CONCLUSION Sadly, even if killing the civilian population is not intended in a war, the so-called "new wars" confront soldiers, politicians, and international leaders with problems unknown so far. Asymmetric warfare has replaced interstate war-the opponents of conventional armies are now irregular armies, which, because they are militarily inferior, evade open battle. This type of warfare could be the military campaigns of rebel armies against unpopular regimes, insurgencies of ethnic minorities against majority re-
